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China has become the world’s leading exporter, 
and specialists in international relations confirm that it is increasingly exporting high-tech products. 
However, a rigorous analysis of this development confined to the traditional study of trade flows 
would be misleading. In fact, from the 1980s onwards East Asia has been characterized by the 
development of regional production networks and trade patterns that are radically modifying the 
paradigm of international trade, with important consequences for the dynamics of multilateral trade 
agreements. 
As demonstrated in the figure to the right, this process gained traction at the mid-1980s, after the 
revaluation of the yen imposed by the United States as part of the Plaza Accord of 1985, when 
Japanese corporations began to relocate entire value-added production chains from Malaysia to 
South Korea, Taiwan, and other Southeast Asian countries. 
The 1990s and the first few years of the 2000s 
witnessed the emergence of the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the 
regional production networks. However, by 2005 the production dynamic had shifted toward China, 
which quickly and incontestably became the region’s most important trade hub, both in terms of 
exports and imports. 
In fact, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, South Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia became major 
suppliers of China, relegating Japan, the traditional regional trade power, to a secondary trade status, 
even though it remained a relevant regional player by means of its massive investments in Taiwan 
and Malaysia. 
China: Main “Assembler” in Asia 
Although China is often referred to as the “world’s factory,” a more complex picture of its role in 
the world economy emerges when the value-added content in each unit of Chinese-exported 
manufactured products is analyzed. Since 2006 China has become the “assembler of Asia,” as two-
thirds of its imports are intermediary goods from East Asian countries which China then transforms 
into end products. 
China primarily sells its finished products to countries of the European Union and the United States 
(between 1992 and 2006, Chinese exports of finished products to East Asian countries fell from 55 
percent to 26.5 percent of its total exports). Although processing trade (this term refers to the 
business activity of importing all or part of the required raw and auxiliary materials, parts and 
components, accessories and packaging materials from abroad in bulk, and re-exporting the finished 
products after processing or assembly by enterprises within the Chinese mainland) now accounts for 
a declining share of China’s total trade, this share is still significant: In fact, it decreased from 49 
percent (55 percent of all exports and 42 percent of all imports) in 2000, to 39 percent in 2010 (47 
percent of all exports and 30 percent of all imports). We can therefore deduce that China’s growth 
depends on exports as much as imports, and that the high technological content of the latter may 
explain that Chinese exports are now more sophisticated than one would have expected, especially 
considering the current moderate level of China’s industrial development. 
In other words, until one computes the domestic value added (DVA) present in the Chinese 
processing trade, the full significance of the role played by China in world trade can hardly be 
grasped. For example, the export of an iPod that is recorded in China’s trade statistics as having a 
value of $150 has actually gained an added value of only $4 after being processed in the Chinese 
manufacturing system. Its remaining value is simply the sum of the costs of the imported 
components. Moreover, a recent academic study reveals that, while the total manufacturing cost of 
an iPad is $275, the value added in China is only $10. 
Since components for electronic products make up a significant quantity of the goods traded among 
Asian countries, the difference between the market value (final price) of China’s exported products 
and the value added by processing them in China has huge importance. Moreover, if trade statistics 
use the value-added criterion for calculating trade volumes, then some interesting numbers can be 
derived. For example, according to estimates by the weekly magazine The Economist, the use of the 
value-added method would significantly reduce the current account deficit incurred by the U.S. with 
China in 2011, from $300 billion to only $150 billion. In addition, a report released by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 2010 stated that an appreciation of 
the renminbi would not necessarily lead to a reduction of the U.S. budget deficit, as it would make 
both Chinese imported goods and U.S. exported goods made with Chinese components more 
expensive. In essence, the U.S.-China trade imbalance is more due to multilateral then bilateral 
trade. 
Finally, after delineating the value of the imported components, even in the period 2005 to 2006, 
over 80 percent of exports from China were still made up of labor-intensive goods, an indicator that 
showed that the rise of high-tech manufacturing would be a long process, and not a particularly 
obvious one. 
Asia’s Economically Complementary Countries 
The integration of China into global production networks has given East Asian countries new 
opportunities to specialize in one or more specific value added links in the production process, with 
the products’ final assembly being undertaken in mainland China. Rather than talking about 
competition between East and Southeast Asian countries, we should interpret the new 
interconnectedness of these economies as growing complementarily in the production process. For 
instance, it has been estimated that a 1 percent increase in Chinese exports contributes to a 0.51 
percent increase in Japan’s total exports, 0.42 percent in South Korea’s, 0.70 percent in Thailand’s, 
and even 0.89 percent in the Philippines’. Moreover, a 1 percent increase in its GDP means that 
China will import 0.7 percent more from East Asian countries than OECD countries. 
Two final points are worth mentioning, First, the Chinese leadership is being faced with the 
dilemma of having to choose between retaining its neoliberal techno-globalism, i.e. continuing to 
welcome foreign capital (which, as is well known, is heavily concentrated in the final assembly of 
products for export), or focusing instead on reinforcing the internal technology apparatus, which 
may mean adopting old and new forms of protectionism (“techno-nationalism”). 
Second, regionalization without regionalism in East Asia appears to be proceeding without there 
being a need to create Free Trade Areas (FTAs), a measure traditionally associated with the 
reduction of tariff barriers. For example, the vast majority of the components for assembling 
electronic products cross the border under duty-free terms. The recent proliferation of FTAs in the 
region, however, seems to be more politically than economically motivated, being part of the 
complex process of forging friendly relations and alliances between trade partners against the 
backdrop of an emerging new chess game between China and the Unites States. 
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